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The current study examined how event saliency and 
reason for action influence the amount of regret 
anticipated about a foregone option, and on people’s 
anticipated choice of behavior when they are confronted 
with a choice between two equally aversive options. The 
participants were 120 undergraduate psychology 
students. Participants who were prompted to imagine 
choosing to fulfill an internal desire instead of an internal 
obligation anticipated significantly more regret than 
those who were prompted to make the opposite choice. 
No significant differences in the amount of regret 
anticipated was found between participants who had to 
choose between two external obligations. Interestingly, 
participants were not more likely to choose an action 
which would have avoided a salient outcome, when 
imagining actually being in the situation. These findings 
were interpreted to suggest dissociation between 
people’s anticipated emotions and subsequent choice of 
action regarding important preventative health behavior. 




Counterfactual thinking involves thoughts of “what if” 
or “if only” after an event has occurred, allowing us to 
consider alternative versions of reality- how an event 
could have turned out better or worse.  Counterfactual 
thoughts are comprised of an antecedent (e.g., “If only I 
had done X…”) and an outcome (“…Y would have 
never happened”). Hence, engaging in upward 
counterfactual thinking (i.e., where one compares what 
has happened with a more desirable outcome) has been 
shown to help people learn from their mistakes by 
allowing the identification of events and/or actions that 
caused a particular outcome, thus highlighting how to 
avoid them in the future (Roese, 1994).  
A concept related to counterfactual thinking is 
anticipated regret which involves imagining how much 
regret would be felt following an imagined, 
unfavourable future event (Bell, 1982; Zeelenberg, 
Beattie, ven der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). Studies have 
shown that anticipating future negative affect caused by 
a choice to engage in a particular behaviour can 
decrease the likelihood that the individual will engage 
in this behaviour in the future, as they will want to 
minimise the chances of experiencing this regret (Page 
& Colby, 2003). Janis and Mann (1977) have referred 
to this process as ‘vigilant decision making’. They 
purport that anticipating regret makes people more 
attentive to their surroundings, and makes them think 
more carefully and elaborately about their 
circumstances, creating stronger attitudes and 
improving decision-making processes.  
Paradigms in experiments which assess 
counterfactual and anticipated regret commonly require 
participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which 
a choice was made and a negative outcome resulted. 
Other paradigms require participants to choose between 
two potential outcomes where a negative outcome 
resulted from this choice, making the outcome more 
salient. However, in most studies one of the two 
potential outcomes is obviously a bad outcome and the 
other obviously good. Naturally, when deciding 
between two alternatives, we most often choose the 
option which we believe will elicit the least amount of 
regret. Paradigms that are comprised of one bad 
outcome and a default ‘good’ option limit the 
interpretability of the effects of counterfactual thoughts 
and thoughts of anticipated regret on decision making 
and behaviour. Such paradigms do not directly 
manipulate the anticipation of counterfactual regret; this 
regret is instead influenced by the framing of the 
decision or the decision itself (Hetts, Boninger, Armor, 
Gleicher & Nathanson, 2000). Hence, thoughts of 
anticipated counterfactual regret may only be able to 
influence choices when such a default ‘good’ outcome 
is available (Simonson, 1992). Such paradigms may 
also have limited ecological validity as they don’t 
consider how decisions may be made when competing 
motivational factors are present, and a choice has to be 
made between two alternatives. To address these issues 
Hetts, et al. (2000) conducted a study which examined 
how anticipated regret influences decision making and 
behaviour when one of two equally aversive outcomes 
is made salient. In their study participants were 
instructed to imagine they had arrived at college for an 
important exam. On their way to the exam they realised 
they may have forgotten to lock their car door. They 
were either told that they went back to check their car 
which was locked and they consequently performed 
poorly on the exam (‘exam regret’) or they went to the 
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exam to later go back to their car to find it had been 
broken into (‘car regret’). Participants were required to 
indicate whether they would have gone to check their 
car or to go straight to class for the exam. Results 
showed that participants induced to imagine a future 
regret were more likely to choose behaviours that 
would avoid the experience of that regret. That is, 
participants in the car regret condition were more likely 
to say that they would have gone back to check their 
car, and vice versa for the exam regret condition. This 
study demonstrates that anticipatory counterfactual 
thoughts may still be generated when there is no 
alternative, ‘good’ option available, and that other 
factors (such as event saliency) may be used to evaluate 
the situation and to make such decisions.  
Apart from event saliency, another factor shown to 
influence decision making and behaviour is reason for 
action. Walsh and Byrne (2007) have shown that if the 
reason for a person’s action was out of obligation (for 
example, in compliance with societal rules and/or 
norms); they are less likely to think in a counterfactual 
manner following an adverse event. This is because 
these types of reasons are seen as less mutable and 
alterations to the choice of action as not permissible. 
However, if the reason for a person’s action was in 
order to serve their own desires or goals, then people 
tend to think of more possible counterfactual outcomes 
following an adverse event. This is because these 
desires are seen as more changeable, and alternative 
outcomes more permissible.  
In the experiment to be reported in this paper, we 
explored how event saliency and reason for action in 
combination may influence the amount of regret 
anticipated about a foregone option, and on people’s 
anticipated choice of behaviour in a health-related 
context. The boundaries between personal desires and 
obligations can be unclear at times as one may be 
motivated to engage in a behaviour not only because 
they are obliged to but also because they want to. The 
current experiment examined the effects on regret and 
behaviour when a clear comparison between these 
different types of reasons is made. The information 
gained from this study may allow insight into how 
people make decisions in complex circumstances. This 
is of particular importance in health-related contexts as 
this information can be used in campaign messages to 
persuade people to take better care of their health and 
engage in preventative health checks- particularly in 
skin cancer preventative checks. While primary 
prevention of this disease (i.e., preventing cancer by 
employing protective behaviours, such as using 
sunscreen, and avoiding the sun) is of extreme 
importance, secondary prevention measures (i.e., 
preventing symptoms that have already developed from 
worsening) are just as vital. In fact, it is estimated that 
over one third of all fatal cancer cases could be 
prevented by making lifestyle changes and many more 
could be effectively treated (and far more cost-
effectively) if they were detected early (Cancer Council 
Australia, 2009). While many contemporary campaigns 
focus on the primary prevention of skin cancer, fewer 
of these address the issues and barriers preventing 
people from going to get their skin examined by a 
professional, after having identified a suspicious growth 
or change on their skin. 
We modified the paradigm used by Hetts et al. (2000) 
so that it was obvious the salient outcome was caused 
by choosing to fulfill either an internal desire or an 
obligation. To further examine this concept the choice 
between the two adverse outcomes was either between 
an internal desire and an obligation, or between two 
obligations.  
We expected participants prompted to imagine 
fulfilling an internal desire (going on a holiday) over an 
obligation (seeking expert diagnosis for suspected 
melanoma) would anticipate significantly more regret 
than participants prompted to make the opposite choice. 
We expected no differences in anticipated regret 
between participants told they had to choose between 
two competing obligations (attending an interstate 
family funeral vs. seeking expert diagnosis for 
suspected melanoma). 
We also asked how participants believed they would 
have acted had they actually been in the situation 
described. We expected participants would indicate 
they would have chosen the action opposite to what was 
depicted (i.e., the action that would have avoided the 
negative outcome), especially if the outcome resulted 
from choosing to fulfill a desire over an obligation. 
Participants told to imagine they chose to fulfill a health 
obligation over a desire were not expected to say they 
would have made the choice opposite to what was 
described (i.e., to go on the holiday and skip getting 
their skin checked for cancer) as missing out on a 
holiday in return for peace of mind that their health is in 
good condition may seem worthwhile. At most we 
expected participants in this condition to demonstrate 
only a slight preference for going on the holiday over 
getting their skin checked.  For participants who were 
told they had to choose between fulfilling two 
obligations it was expected that they would choose to 
avoid the salient outcome by choosing the action 
opposite to what was prescribed.  
Method  
Participants 
The participants were 120 psychology students (male: 
27; female: 93). The ages of the participants ranged 
from 17.67 to 52.25 years, with a mean age of 22.87 
years. Participants took part in the experiment on a 
voluntary basis after providing written informed 
consent. Recruitment of participants and all research 
activities for this study were in accordance with 
protocol approved by the University of Wollongong 
Human Research Ethics Committee.  
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Design and materials 
The experiment employed a 2 (reason for action) x 2 
(salient outcome) between-subjects factorial design. 
This resulted in four experimental conditions. However, 
two additional control conditions were also included to 
assess participants’ baseline preferences for the given 
behavioural options. Hence, participants were randomly 
allocated to read one of six different stories (n=20) 
which manipulated event saliency and reason for action 
and were designed to elicit anticipated counterfactual 
regret. One of two core story versions could be 
presented, which varied according to the nature of the 
event that competed with a decision to check up on a 
suspected case of melanoma: one where the competing 
choice was to fulfill an internal desire (internal desire 
version [IDV]), the other to fulfill a social obligation 
(social obligation version [SOV]). In the SOV we chose 
to pit the health obligation against a social obligation to 
create enough of a difference between the competing 
choices while still maintaining an obligatory status.  
Participants were told that due to financial constraints, 
they could only afford to choose to fulfill either the 
health obligation or the “other” option (i.e., the social 
obligation or internal desire). Within each of the two 
story versions there were three separate conditions: two 
experimental conditions in which one of two different 
outcomes could be made salient, and a control condition 
in which no such saliency manipulation was made so 
baseline preferences for each action could be assessed. 
In each experimental condition, it was made clear the 
outcome resulted from choosing to fulfill an internal 
desire, a social obligation or a health obligation.  
Participants who received the IDV core story were 
told that they had to make a choice between getting a 
suspicious looking mole on their arm checked by a 
dermatologist (health obligation) and going on a ‘once-
in-a-lifetime’ trip with friends (internal desire). Event 
saliency was manipulated by either instructing them to 
imagine that they had chosen to go on the trip with 
friends to later find out that the mole was cancerous, or 
that they had chosen to get their skin checked out to 
find that it was benign and they hence, missed out on 
the trip.  
Participants who received the SOV core story were 
told that they had to choose between getting their skin 
checked for cancer (health obligation) and attending a 
much loved family member’s interstate funeral (social 
obligation). They were then either told to imagine that 
they had chosen to attend the funeral to later be 
diagnosed with cancer, or that they had chosen to get 
their skin checked to find it was benign and they hence, 
missed out on saying goodbye to a loved one. We chose 
to focus the health obligation choice in each condition 
around a hypothetical skin cancer scenario due to the 
high prevalence of this cancer type in Australian 
society, and its ability to affect people of all ages, 
ethnicities and genders (Cancer Council Australia, 
2003). 
Procedure 
Participants took part in the study either individually or 
in small groups with up to three other people. 
After providing informed consent participants were 
randomly assigned to read one of the six story versions 
(n=20). Afterwards participants were required to 
respond to questions related to their story version. The 
participants in the experimental conditions were firstly 
required to answer a question related to how much 
regret they anticipate they would feel in relation to the 
highlighted potential story outcome. They responded on 
a seven point rating scale ranging from ‘very regretful’ 
(7) to ‘not at all regretful’ (1), with an ‘undecided’ 
option available as the mid-point. Control participants 
did not receive this initial question. Subsequently all 
participants answered a question related to which 
course of action they would have taken had they 
actually been in the situation. They indicated their 
response on a three-point categorical response scale 
with ‘get your mole checked with a dermatologist’ on 
one end of the scale and either ‘go on interstate holiday 
with your friends’ (IDV) or ‘go interstate to attend the 
family funeral’ (SOV) on the other end. Unlike Hetts et 
al. (2000), who employed a two option forced response 
format for this question, an ‘undecided’ option was also 
included in the current experiment as it was 
hypothesised  this may represent a legitimate category 
of people who were genuinely undecided. In total the 
experiment took around 10 minutes to complete. Upon 
completion of the task participants were debriefed.  
Results 
All analyses were evaluated against an alpha level of 
.05. A 2 (reason for action) x 2 (salient outcome) 
univariate ANOVA was conducted on mean regret 
ratings.  
The means for regret ratings for the four experimental 
groups can be found in Figure 1. A main effect of 
saliency was found, F(1, 77)= 52.28, p=.000. A 
significant interaction was also found between reason 
for action and event saliency, F(1,77)= 7.37, p=.008. 
Upon examination of the simple effects it was found 
that there was a significant difference in the amount of 
regret felt between the internal desire and health 
obligation groups (MD=2.41, SE=.42, p=.000); however 
there was no significant difference between the amount 
of regret felt between the social obligation and health 
obligation groups (MD=.80, SE=.42, p=.062), 
supporting our hypothesis.  
A chi-square analysis was conducted to examine the 
relationship between the story condition and the action 
participants indicated they would have taken were they 
actually in the situation. This analysis was done on the 
control and experimental groups separately. The 
percentages of control participants’ responding can be 
found in Figure 2. A significant difference in 
responding was found between the two control groups, 
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χ2(2)=10.98, p=004. Results indicate that baseline 
preferences for participants who read the IDV story 
were more likely to say they would get their skin 
checked for cancer than go on the holiday with friends. 
For participants who received the SOV, story responses 
were more evenly spread between ‘get your mole 
checked with dermatologist’ and ‘go interstate to attend 
the family funeral’ (χ2(2)=1.97, p=.740). This finding is 
consistent the reason for action prediction, i.e., that 
participants would be more likely to avoid anticipated 
counterfactual regret especially if it resulted from 
choosing to fulfill a desire over an obligation. 
Participants who had to choose between fulfilling two 
obligations did not clearly identify one response option 
that would avoid greater feelings of anticipated 
counterfactual regret. 
The percentages of the actions chosen for each 
experimental condition can be found in Figure 3. No 
significant difference in responding was found for the 
experimental groups where participants had to choose 
between fulfilling an internal desire or an external 
obligation, χ2(2)=.31, p=.857, nor was a significant 
difference found when the participants had to choose 
between fulfilling two obligations, χ2(2)=.47, p=.792. 
Although these results show that participants were more 
likely to indicate they would have acted in a manner 
which would have avoided the salient outcome, these 
results did not reach significance. Compared to the 
control groups, the results were more evenly spread 
between the two response options for both the IDV and 
SOV groups. Within each experimental group, there 
were also a sizeable proportion of participants choosing 
the “undecided” option. These results indicate that the 
combination of event saliency and reason for action 
does not significantly make participants want to avoid 





Figure 1:  Ratings for the four experimental conditions. 
“Other” refers to either internal desire or social obligation. 
Error bars represent ±1 units of standard error. 
 
 
Figure 2: Participants’ anticipated choice of behaviour by 
core story version for each control condition.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Participants anticipated choice of behaviour by 
story version and experimental condition.  
Discussion 
This experiment explored how event saliency and 
reason for action may influence the amount of regret 
anticipated about a foregone option and on people’s 
anticipated choice of behaviour in a health related 
context. Consistent with our expectations, when having 
to choose between two competing actions, both with the 
potential to result in a bad outcome, making a choice to 
fulfill an internal desire over an obligation increases the 
amount of regret felt. Less regret is felt if a negative 
outcome resulted from choosing to fulfill one obligation 
over another. This information can hopefully be applied 
to health promotion campaigns. Recent campaigns have 
aimed to encourage people to go for cancer screening 
even when there are other competing external 
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cancer won’t wait. Everything else can” aims to place 
health obligations before any other types of obligation 
(National Breast and Ovarian Cancer Centre, 2008). 
However, based on the results of this experiment, 
messages may be effective if they emphasise that it is 
more important to take care of one’s health than to 
fulfill competing desires that may sometimes be viewed 
as high-priority obligations. 
The results show that saliency and reason for action 
do not significantly influence participants’ anticipated 
choice of action in the manner expected. Hetts et al. 
(2000) found that participants were more likely to 
choose an action that avoided the described negative 
outcome when event saliency alone was manipulated. 
We expected that participants in the IDV groups who 
were told that they chose to fulfill an internal desire 
over an obligation would be more likely to indicate they 
would chose to get their skin checked out for cancer 
rather than go on a holiday with friends. For 
participants who imagined that they fulfilled a health 
obligation over a desire we expected responses to be 
more evenly spread, but with a slight preference for 
going on the holiday with friends. For participants in 
both of the SOV groups we expected participants who 
were told that they went to the funeral and ended up 
with skin cancer to indicate they would get their skin 
checked by the dermatologist; and for participants who 
were told they got their skin checked for cancer and 
missed out on the family funeral to indicate they would 
have chosen to go to the funeral. However, in our 
experimental groups participants did not readily choose 
the action that would have avoided the outcome and 
hence, the associated counterfactual regret. This finding 
suggests that getting people to imagine the reasons for 
action makes them think about the possible factors that 
could influence the situation (such as competing 
obligations and desires) and prevent them from carrying 
out the action. When trying to persuade people to take 
an action (such as preventative health checks) it may 
not merely be enough to get them to think about the 
negative outcomes of and regret caused by an action (or 
inaction), it is also important to get them to consider the 
wider context (particularly reasons for action) and get 
them to work through any barriers that may be present, 
as these undoubtedly will arise in real life.  
At this point the limitations of this study need to be 
addressed. Placing the “undecided” response option as a 
midpoint on the continuous rating scale which 
examined how much regret was felt may have 
confounded results. The responses ranged from “not at 
all regretful” to “very regretful” so have an “undecided” 
response as a midpoint may indicate that there is some 
regret felt. Instead of placing this “undecided” option as 
a midpoint it should have been placed next to the scale, 
rather than be included within it. Based on the lack of 
significant difference between the four experimental 
conditions on anticipated behaviour it may be that the 
scenarios were not properly tapping into (possibly 
demographic) appropriate constructs. Alternatively the 
results may have been confounded by the presence of 
an ‘undecided’ response option. The high prevalence of 
participants indicating they were “undecided” portrays 
the dilemma participants faced in the scenarios. In order 
to gain a better understanding of the effects of event 
saliency and reason for action on anticipated behaviour, 
it may be better to provide a two-alternative forced 
response for this question as in the Hetts et al. (2000) 
study. Hence, further validation of the testing materials 
and response options is necessary before any definite 
conclusions about the joint effects of event saliency and 
reason for action on decision making can be made. 
Research also needs to be done with a community 
sample to enhance ecological utility so that findings can 
be generalized to the wider community. 
In conclusion, the current experiment allowed a 
preliminary investigation using a complex paradigm 
which examined the interaction between event saliency 
and reason for action and the effects of these variables 
on anticipated regret and behaviour in a health related 
context. Pending further investigation and validation of 
testing materials, the principles governing human 
judgment about salient outcomes and reasons for 
actions can hopefully be applied to preventative health 
campaigns to improve population health outcomes. 
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